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1. Introduction  
The architectural model of Internet telephony is rather different than that of the 
traditional telephone network. The base assumption is that all signaling and media flow 
over an IP-based network, either the public Internet or various intranets. IP-based 
networks, present the appearance at the network level that any machine can communicate 
directly with any other, unless the network specifically restricts them from doing so, 
through such means as firewalls. This architectural change necessitates a dramatic 
transformation in the architectural assumptions of traditional telephone networks. In 
particular, whereas in a traditional network a large amount of administrative control, 
such as call-volume limitation, implicitly resides at every switch, and thus additional 
controls can easily be added there without much architectural change, in an Internet 
environment an administrative point of control must be explicitly engineered into a 
network, as in a firewall; otherwise end systems can simply bypass any device which 
attempts to restrict their behavior. In addition, the Internet model transforms the locations 
at which many services are performed. In general, end systems are assumed to be much 
more intelligent than in the traditional telephone model; thus, many services which 
traditionally had to reside within the network can be moved out to the edges, without 
requiring any explicit support for them within the networks. Other services can be 
performed by widely separated specialized servers which result in call setup information 
traversing paths which might be extremely indirect when compared with the physical 
network’s actual topology. 
Most of the services and service features of ITU-T Q.1211 can be provided by the IETF’s 
draft signaling standards for Internet Telephony, SIP (the Session Initiation Protocol) 
(Schulzrinne, 2001) and, for some more specialized features, its Call Control extensions 
(Johnston, 2002). 
However, The growing globalization and the liberalization of the market 
telecommunications,  necessitates a more global infrastructure of IN  that satisfies the needs 
of different subscribed legal implied, especially for multinational services  subscribed. A lot 
of these services are offered on a current system, but are often realized with specialists of the 
system. The concepts of IN for giving such service is a coherent and stable basis 
(Schulzrinne, 2001). Some security functions have been introduced already in current 
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systems, but they define constraints to user groups with the private line means, the 
proprietor equipment and proprietor algorithms or secrets. 
There is a major difference between the realization of today service (limited) and the goals of 
the introduction of IN, however, the IN offer its services to a public world, open, and 
especially to offer the services that allow user groups to  communicate by the public 
transmission and to change the equipment without unloading their intimacy and affluence 
of employment.  Therefore, the services of security provides for the current network will not 
be sufficient for IN, the goal is more long. The defying of the aspect of the new security 
functions has to make then be publicly usable, economically feasible and insured all its at 
the same time. 
2. Interconnecting SIP and telecom service application 
The IN (Intelligent Network) functional architecture identifies several entities such as the 
service switching function (SSF), the service control functions (SCF), and the call control 
function (CCF) that model the behavior of the IN network. The CCF represents the 
normal activities of call and the connection processing in traditional switch, for two 
clients. The SSF model’s additional functionality required for interacting with a service 
logic program executed by the SCF. The CCF and the SSF are generally co-located in 
specific switching centers, known as SSP, while the SCFs are hosted on dedicated 
computers known as SCP. The communication between the different nodes uses the 
INAP protocol. 
Accessing IN services from the IMS network requires that one or more entities in these 
networks can play the role of an SSP and communicate with existing SCPs via the INAP 
protocol.  
To realize services with SIP it is important that the SIP entity be able to provide features 
normally provided by the traditional switch, including operating as a SSP for IN features.  
The SIP entity should also maintain call state and trigger queries to IN-based services, just as 
traditional switches do. 
The most expeditious manner for providing existing IN services in the IP domain is to use 
the deployed IN infrastructure as much as   possible. 
The  creation of a  service by SIP is possible by the three methods INVITE, Bye and options 
and fields of header SIP Contact, Also, Call-Disposition Replace and  Requested-by that are 
extensions of SIP specified by IETF (Fing, 2001). Some services are already specified by IETF 
(Gisin, Ribordy, 2001) by using methods and fields of already quoted header: Call, Hold, 
Transfer of call, Return of call, Third party control. 
The key to programming telecom services with SIP is to add logic that guides behavior at 
each of the elements in the system (Johnston, 2002). In a SIP proxy server, this logic would 
dictate where the requests are proxies to, how the results are processed, and how the packet 
should be formatted.  
The basic model for providing logic for SIP services is shown in Figure 1. The figure 
shows a SIP server that has been augmented with service logic, which is a program that is 
responsible for creating the services. When requests and responses arrive, the server 
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passes information up to the service logic. The service logic makes some decisions based 
on this information, and other information it gathers from different resources, and passes 
instructions back to the server. The server then executes these instructions (Johnston, 
2002). 
 
Fig. 1. Model for Programming SIP Services  
The separation of the service logic from the server is certainly not new. This idea is inspired 
by the Intelligent Network (IN) concept (Chapron, 2001). This separation enables rapid 
development of new services; the idea also exists on the web. 
The mechanisms used in these environments can provide valuable insight on how a 
solution for SIP, IN integration. SIP does not operate the model of call IN directly to 
access to services IN, the trick is then to bypass the machine of states of the entity SIP with 
the layer IN  such that the acceptance of the call and the routing  is executed by the native 
states and service machine are accessed to layers  IN with the model of call  IN (El 
Ouahidi, 2000). The model of service programming with SIP consists therefore in add on 
SIP server an IN layer, that manages the interconnection with the IN called SIN (SIP 
Intelligent Network) (Gurbani, 2002). This operation necessitates the definition of a 
correspondence between the model of call IN and the model of call SIP, it is to tell a 
correspondence between the state machine of the SIP protocol (SIP defines the header 
Record_Route that allows to order SIP server to function in mode with the states until the 
liberation of the call) and the state machine of IN. A call will be processed by the two 
machines, the state machine SIP processes the initiation of a call and the final reply 
deliverance, and the IN layer communicate with the intelligent point SCP to provide 
services during processing of  the call (Gurbani, 2002). The figure 2 illustrates the 
integration SIP-IN. 
Similarly to the machine of states IN, one defines the quoted calling and called the entity (O-
SIP) and (T-SIP) which are entities corresponding, respectively, to the O-BCSM and T-BCSM 
of the model IN. 
In the basic system of  SIP, the SIP proxy with this control of call “ intelligent " is defined to 
interconnect with intelligent network, this intelligence is realized by the use of control calls, 
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that can synchronize with the model of call  IN (BCSM). According to RFC 2543 (SIP) one 
can define calls of the state machine of the SIP client and SIP server [7,8]. The 11 PICs of 
O_BCSM come into play when a call request (SIP INVITE  message) arrives from an 
upstream SIP client to an originating SIN-enabled SIP entity running the IN call model.  This 
entity will create an O_BCSM object and initialize it in the O_NULL PIC.  The next seven IN 
PICs -- O_NULL, AUTH_ORIG_ATT, COLLECT_INFO, ANALYZE_INFO, 
SELECT_ROUTE, AUTH_ CALL_SETUP, CALL_SENT, O_Alerting and O_Active,  can all 
be mapped to  the SIP "Calling" state. Figure 3 below provides a visual mapping from the 
SIP protocol state machine to the originating half of the IN call model.  Note that control of 
the call shuttles between the SIP protocol machine and the IN O_BCSM call model while it is 
being serviced. 
S C P S C P
G W G W
S IN
O -S IP T -S IP
S IN
P
S
T
N
 
Fig. 2. Interconnection SIP-IN 
The SIP "Calling" protocol state has enough functionality to absorb  the seven PICs. From 
server of SIP proxy point of view, its initial state could be corresponded to the O_NULL PIC 
of the O_BCSM. Its processing state could be corresponded to the Auth_Ori_att, 
Collect_Info, Analyse_info, Select_ Route, Auth_Call_Setup, Senf_Call and O_Alerting PICs. 
Its success, confirmed and complete states could be corresponded to the O_Active PIC. 
Figure 4 below provides a visual mapping from the SIP protocol state  machine to the 
terminating half of the IN Call model. 
When the SIP server of termination receives the message INVITE, it creates the  T_ BCSM 
object and initials it to the PIC T_Null, this operation is realized by the state " Proceeding " 
that orders the five PICs : T_Null, Auth_Ter_Att, Select_Facility, PICs of the T_BCSM. Its 
calling state could be corresponded to the prrsent_Call PIC. Its call processing state could be 
corresponded to the T_Alerting. Its complete state could be corresponded to the T_Active 
PIC. 
The service-level call flows for Voice over IP communication where interconnecting between 
the PSTN and IP-based networks are necessary to complete a call.   
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Fig. 3. Mapping from SIP to O_BCSM 
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Fig. 4. Mapping from SIP to T_BCSM. 
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3. Threats in the intelligent network (telecom service)  
As all elements of a network can be distributed geographically and that element of system 
IP is totally opened, several threats of security can rise and attack these different elements. 
The interconnection IN, is the process to execute a demand of service IN on the part of the 
user of service through at least two different autonomous areas. Typically, each area 
represents a system IN separated with different legal entities and entities of resource IN. 
The limp of the IN service is only to be executed, if the two different areas cooperates by 
exchanging management, control, and services of data on the basis of a legal contract (co-
contract of operation). In this competition, each area applies these clean mechanisms to 
provide the integrity, the availability, and the intimacy of service users. If the two operators 
that distribute cooperate, they have to apply the same totality of mechanisms to exchange 
data between their SCPs and SDPs. 
The main problems of security that pose in the multimedia communication area and the 
telephony over IP as well in a system IN under IP are following: 
- Imitation of attack: users not authorized can try to access to services of IN. For example, 
in the case of service IMR a user not recorded can try to see video services. 
- Simulating attack: A recorded user can try to avoid the policy of security and obtains 
illegitimately access to sensitive services. For example, a user with common access 
privileges can try to act as an administrator of service IN. 
- Denial of Service attack: an adversary can try to block users to access to the services of 
IN. For example to send a great number of requests to the system simultaneously 
- Communication to spy and alter: an adversary can try to spy and/or to modify the 
communication between a legitimate user and elements of service IN. 
- Lack of responsibility: if IN is not capable to verify the communication between users 
and its elements of service, then it will not be possible to make these users responsible 
for their actions.   
The list is not complete. In practice, nevertheless, one can be found confronted with others 
problems of security, considered as not belonging of the area of application (for example, 
problems linked, the policy of security, the security of  the  management system, to security 
of the implementation, the operational security or to the processing of security incidents). As 
well as the technological evolution on the soft, does not cease to increase in a manner not 
estimable, similarly, the technological connection tools to the system and the attack passive 
and active become impressive things? 
If the system and its components are not sufficiently secured, a lot threats can occur.  
However, it is necessary always to consider:   
 What is the probability of a threat (occurrence; likelihood)? 
 What are the potential damages (impact)? 
 What are the costs to prevent a threat? 
Depending on these suppositions, the cost and the efficiency of security mechanisms has to 
be implemented. The potential of the threat depends on the implementation of IN, the 
specific service IN. They depend also on the implementation of security mechanisms (ex. 
PIN, strong authentication, placement of authentication, management of key, etc.). 
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Manufacturers as well as the groups of standardization make the work of the analysis of 
risks in the order to improve the security of systems IN. Although a many improvements 
have already been realized, concerning the security of access to SCP and SMP. New services 
and new architectural concepts necessitate supplementary improvements. The next figure, 
figure 5, presents places of the different threats. 
Intelligent networks are distributed by nature. This distribution is realized not only to the  
superior level where the services are described as a collection of service feature (SF), but to 
too low levels, where the functional entities (FE) can be propagated on different physical 
entities (PE). Like the communications of various elements of the network are realized on 
the open and uncertain environment, the security mechanisms have to be applied. 
A responsible of the system can prevent these threats of security by using the various 
mechanisms. The authentication has to be applied in the order to prevent users not 
authorized to earn the access to the distribution of services. 
 
Fig. 5. Places of the different threats. 
4. Secure the telecom service with SIP 
SIP Communication is susceptible to confront several types of attack. The simplest attacks in 
the SIP permit to a hacker of earning the information on users’ identities, services, media 
and topology of the distribution. This information can be employed to excute others types of 
attacks. The modification of attack occurs when an assailant intercept the effort and covers 
the signal and modify the SIP message in the order to change a certain characteristic of a 
service. For example, this sort of attack can be employed for diverting the flow of signaling 
by forcing a particular itinerary or for changing a recording of the user or modifying a 
profile of service (Profos, 2002). The sort of attack depends on the type of security (or 
insecurity) employed (the type of authentication, etc.). These attacks can also be employed 
for the denial of service. 
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The main two mechanisms of security employed with SIP: authentication and the 
encryption data. The authentication of data is employed to authenticate the sender message 
and insure that certain sensitive information of the message was not modified in the transit. 
It has to prevent an assailant to modify and/or listen in SIP requests and reply. SIP employs 
Proxy -Authentication, Proxy -Authorization, authorization, and WWW - Authentication of 
areas of the letterhead, similar to these of HTTP, for the authentication of the terminal 
system by the means of a numerical signature. Rather, proxy-by-proxy authentication can be 
executed by using the authentication protocols over Internet such that, the transport layer 
TLS or SSL and the network layer IPSEC. 
The cryptography of data is employed to, ensure the confidentiality in SIP communication, 
allowing only the legal receiver client to decrypt and read data. It is usual of using algorithms 
of cryptography such that the DES (DES: Data Encryption Standard) and Advanced AES (AES: 
Advanced Encryption Standard). SIP endorses two forms of cryptography: end-to-end and 
hop-by-hop. The end-to-end encryption provides confidentiality for all information (some 
letterhead and the body of SIP message) that needs to be read by intermediate servers or 
proxy. The end-to-end encryption is executed by the mechanism S/MIME. On the contrary, 
the hop-by-hop encryption of whole SIP message can be employed in the order to protect the 
information that would have to be accessed by intermediate entities, such that letterhead From, 
To and Via. The security of such information prevents malevolent users to determine that calls, 
or to access to the information of the itinerary. The hop-by-hop encryption can be executed by 
external security mechanisms to SIP (IPSEC or TLS). 
Before closing this poll of security mechanisms in SIP, it is necessary to consider the efforts of 
standardization processing to improve the security mechanisms for SIP. The most important 
matter here is the problem of the agreement on the chosen security mechanism between two 
SIP entities (user agents and/or proxy) that want to communicate by applying a level of 
«sufficient» security. For this reason, it is very important to define how a SIP entity can select 
an appropriate mechanism for communicating with a next proxy entity. One of the proposals 
for an agreement security mechanism that allows two agents of exchanging their clean security 
aptitudes of preferences in the order to select and apply a common mechanism is, when a 
client initiated the procedure, the SIP agent include in the first request sent to the neighbor 
proxy entity the list of its mechanisms of security sustained. The other element replies with a 
list of its clean security mechanisms and its parameters. The client selects then the common 
security mechanism preferred and use this chosen mechanism (ex, TLS), and contact the proxy 
by using the new mechanism of security (Jennings, 2002). 
With this technique, another problem should be handled. It is the problem with the 
assertion and the validation of the identity of the user by SIP server. The SIP protocol 
allows a user to assert its identity by several manners (ex, in the letterhead); but the 
information of identity requested by the user is not verified in the fundamental SIP 
operation. On the other hand, an IP client of telephony could have required and insure the 
identity of a user in order to provide a specific service and/or to condition the type of 
service to the identity of the user himself. The model of SIP authentication could be a way 
of obtaining such identity; however, the user agents have not always the necessary 
information on key to authenticate with all the other agents. A model is proposed in 
(Profods, 2002) for «confirmed identity» which is based on the concept of a «confirmed 
area». The idea is, that when a user authenticates its clean identity with a proxy, the proxy 
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can share this authenticated identity (the confirmed identity) with all the other proxies in 
the «confirmed area». A confirmed area is a totality of proxies that have a mutual 
configuration of a security association. Such association of security represents a 
confidence between proxies. When a proxy in a «confirmed area» authenticates the 
identity of the author of a message, it adds a new letterhead to the message containing the 
confirmed identity of the user. Such identity can be employed by all other proxies 
belonging to the «confirmed area». 
Using this mechanism the client UAC, is capable to identify himself to a proxy UAS, to an 
intermediate proxy or to a registration proxy. Therefore, the SIP authentication is applied 
only to the communications end-to-end or end-to-proxy; the authentication proxy-by-proxy 
would have to count on others mechanisms as IPsec or TLS. 
 
Fig. 6. Authentication SIP 
The procedure of authentication is executed when the UAS, the proxy intermediate, or the 
necessary recording proxy for the call of the UAC has to be authenticated before accepting 
the call, or the recording. In the beginning the UAS sends a request of SIP message «text» 
(ex, INVITE). In the reception of this message, the UAS, proxy, or recording proxy decides 
that the authentication is necessary and sent to the client a specific SIP error message of the 
request of authentication. This error message represents a challenge. In the particular case, 
where the message of error is 401 (Unauthorized) is sent by UAS and recording, while when 
the message of error is 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) is sent by proxy server. The 
UAC receives the message of error, calculates the reply, and includes it in a new message of 
the SIP request. The next figure 6 shows the sequence of message for the case of request of 
authentication by the proxy server.   
The UAC sends a message ACK immediately after that the message of error is received. This 
message closes the first transaction; then the second message INVITE opens a new 
transaction.     
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INVITE sip:xy@domain SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 
To: xy <sip:xy@domain> 
From: yx <sip:yx@domain> 
Call-ID: 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Contact: <sip:yx@domain> 
Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=…; 
micalg=sha1;protocol=application/pkcs7-signature 
Content-Length: 
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; 
smime-type=envelopeddata; name=smime.p7m 
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;filename=smime.p7m 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary 
<envelopedData object encapsulating encrypted SDP attachment not shown> 
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature;name=smime.p7s 
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;filename=smime.p7s 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary 
<signedData object containing signature not shown> 
 
Fig. 7. S/MIME encryption in SDP 
But this technique is a classic and it’s based on a standard and classical mechanism. It will 
thus be preferable to propose a new technique based on sure cryptographic algorithms such 
as the quantum cryptography. 
5. Elements necessitates security in telecom service 
Manufacturers as well as the groups of standardization make the work of the analysis of 
risks in the order to improve the security of systems IN. Although a lot of improvements 
have already been realized, concerning the security of access to SCP and SMP. New services 
and new architectural concepts necessitate supplementary improvements. The next figure, 
figure 7, presents places of the different threats. 
Intelligent networks are distributed by nature. This distribution is realized not only to the  
superior level where the services are described as a collection of service feature (SF), but 
to too low levels, where the functional entities (FE) can be propagated on different 
physical entities (PE). Like the communications of various elements of the network are 
realized on the open and uncertain environment, the security mechanisms have to be 
applied. 
A responsible of the system can prevent these threats of security by using the various 
mechanisms. The authentication has to be applied in the order to prevent users not 
authorized to earn the access to the distribution of services. 
The cryptography technique that allows detecting a spy and realized the security is the 
technique of quantum cryptography 
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6. Quantum cryptography 
Quantum cryptography does not base security on unproven mathematical problems. 
Instead, the foundation of security lies in the properties of quantum mechanics (Gisin, 
Ribordy, 2001). Three such properties essential for quantum cryptography are: 
1. We cannot make a measurement on an unknown quantum system without perturbing   
unless the measurement is an eigen operator to the quantum state being measured. This 
implies that an eavesdropper (conventionally called Eve) cannot make a measurement 
of an unknown quantum state in order to obtain some information about the key 
without introducing disturbances that can in turn be discovered by Alice and Bob. 
2. We cannot make a copy of an unknown quantum state. This property is usually referred 
to as the no cloning theorem. It prevents an eavesdropper from simply intercepting the 
transmission and making copies of the transmitted quantum states in order to keep copies 
to make measurements on, while passing on an unperturbed quantum state to Bob. 
3. We cannot measure the simultaneous values of non commuting observables on a single 
copy of a quantum state.  
 
Fig. 8. Place of the hacker. 
It ensures that the eavesdropper cannot construct a measurement that is an eigen operator to 
all quantum states used for the key distribution, i.e., it guarantees that it is impossible for 
the eavesdropper to only perform measurements that leave the quantum states unperturbed 
(Hoi, 2008). 
Quantum cryptography cannot securely transmit predetermined information; it can only 
securely generate a random key. Once generated, this random key can be subsequently used 
in a symmetric cipher, such as the one-time pad or one of the modern symmetric ciphers, to 
securely transmit data over a classical communication channel. A running quantum 
cryptography channel will steadily generate new secret key material. Thus, quantum 
cryptography is solving the most difficult problem in modern cryptography, that of key 
distribution. 
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There are mainly two types of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes. One is the prepare-
andmea sure scheme, such as BB84, in which Alice sends each qubit in one of four states of two 
complementary bases; B92, in which Alice sends each qubit in one of two non-orthogonal 
states; six-state, in which Alice sends each qubit in one of six states of three complementary 
bases. The other is the entanglement based QKD, such as E91, in which entangled pairs of 
qubits are distributed to Alice and Bob, who then extract key bits by measuring their qubits; 
BBM92, where each party measures half of the EPR pair in one of two complementary bases. 
6.1 BB84 algorithm 
BB84 is a quantum key distribution scheme developed by C. Bennett and G. Brassard in 
1984. It is the first quantum cryptography protocol. The protocol is provably secure, relying 
on the quantum property that information gain is only possible at the expense of disturbing 
the signal if the two states we are trying to distinguish are not orthogonal. It is usually 
explained as a method of securely communicating a private key from one party to another 
for use in one-time pad encryption. It has the following the phases.  
Step 1. Alice sends a random stream of bits consisting of 1’s and 0’s using a random 
selection of rectilinear and diagonal scheme over the quantum channel. On the 
other side Bob has to measure these photons. He randomly uses one of the two 
schemes (+ or X) to read the qubits. If he has used the right scheme he notes down 
the correct bits or he ends up noting down the wrong bits. This is because one 
cannot measure the polarization of a photon in 2 different ‘basis’ (rectilinear and 
diagonal in our case) simultaneously. For example, suppose Alice sends | using ‘+’ 
scheme to represent 1 and Bob uses ‘+’ scheme and notes down the bit as 1. For the 
second bit Alice sends \ using the ‘X’ scheme to represent 1 but Bob uses an 
incorrect scheme + and miss interprets it as either | or - noting it down correctly as 
1 or 0 incorrectly. 
Step 2. Alice talks to Bob over a regular phone line and tells the polarization schemes (and 
not the actual polarization) she had used for each qubit. Bob then tells Alice which 
of the schemes he had guessed it right. This gives the correct bits noted down by 
Bob. Based on this they discard all the bits Bob had noted down guessing the wrong 
scheme. 
Step 3. The only way for Alice and Bob to check errors would be to read out the whole 
sequence of bits on an ordinary telephone line. This wouldn’t be a wise idea. So 
Alice randomly picks some (say 100) binary digits out of the total number of bits 
that were measured using the correct scheme and checks just these. The probability 
of Eve being online and not affecting Bob’s measurements of 100 bits is 
infinitesimally small. So if they find any discrepancy among the 100 digits they will 
detect Eve’s presence and will discard the whole sequence and start over again. If 
not then they will just discard only those 100 digits discussed over phone and use 
the remaining 1000 digits to be used as one time pad (Johnston, 2002) 
One advantage of quantum cryptography is the ability to detect an eavesdropper since Eve 
can never read the values with out altering them. For example, if Eve reads \ polarization 
using + scheme then he will be altering the polarization of the photon to either – or Ň, 
resulting in binary values 0 or 1 respectively. Eve might be able to get the actual (binary) 
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value of 1 but ends up altering the polarization for Bob. If Bob uses X scheme to measure the 
values he might get either \, which is what Alice sent or /, which is an incorrect 
measurement. 
 
Bit Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Alice : Bits 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Alice : Scheme + + + + X X X + 
Alice : Qubit Ň Ň ņ Ň ⁄ ⁄ \ Ň 
Eve: Scheme X + X + + X + X 
Eve: Qubit / Ň Ň Ň ņ / Ň / 
Bob: Scheme + X X + + X X + 
Bob: Qubit Ň \ \ Ň ņ ⁄ / ņ 
Bob: Bits 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Selection √   √  √ √ √ 
Fig. 8. Key Selection and detecting Eve’s presence 
Here the bits 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 are selected by Alice and Bob since both of them use the same 
detection scheme. But when they randomly check bits 1, 7 and 8 they find that the values are 
different. Through this they can detect the presence of the eavesdropper. 
6.2 BB92 algorithm 
In 1992, Charles Bennett proposed what is essentially a simplified version of BB84 in his 
paper, "Quantum cryptography using any two non-orthogonal states". The key difference in 
B92 is that only two states are necessary rather than the possible 4 polarization states in 
BB84. As 0 can be encoded as 0 degrees in the rectilinear basis and 1 can be encoded by 45 
degrees in the diagonal basis. Like the BB84, Alice transmits to Bob a string of photons 
encoded with randomly chosen bits but this time the bits Alice chooses dictates which bases 
she must use. Bob still randomly chooses a basis by which to measure but if he chooses the 
wrong basis, he will not measure anything; a condition in quantum mechanics which is 
known as an erasure.  Bob can simply tell Alice after each bit she sends whether or not he 
measured it correctly. 
This security feature results from the use of a single or two photons. We know from 
quantum properties of photons that the measurement of spin of one gives the spin of the 
other. So if a given pulse sent from Alice is formed by entangled photons then Eve can split 
these photons using a beam splitter in such a way that he can direct one photon to his 
polarization detector and another to Bob’s. But if only single photons are generated then in 
presence of a beam splitter the photons have to choose between Eve’s and Bob’s polarization 
detectors. This increases the error rate which the BB84 protocol will detect. 
Thus, it is the singleness of the photon that guarantees security (Mohamed, 2007). The figure 
9 represents a probability to spy detected vs photon number: 
Pdet(n) = Pr{MBB84 |= Φdet}  with Φdet = a PCTL equation, is True if spy is detected.  
PCTL : probabilistic temporal logic (Xu, 2009) 
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Fig. 9. Probability to spy detected 
6.3 Quantum key distribution QKD 
The BB84 protocol and its variants are the only known provably secure QKD protocols. 
Other QKD protocols (BB92), although promising, have yet to be proven secure. The benefits 
of QKD are that it can generate and distribute provably secure keys over unsecured 
channels and that potential eavesdropping can be detected (Mohamed, 2007). QKD can 
defeat the current computationally complex key exchange methods. Because QKD generates 
random strings for shared secrets, attaining a QKD system and reverse engineering its 
theory of operation would yield no mechanism to defeat QKD. 
7. Implementation a quantum cryptography in SIP protocol over IMS network 
The IMS has been originally conceived for mobile systems, but with the addition of TISPAN 
works in the 7 version 7, the PSTN are equally supported.  
The IMS is a structured of the architecture of Next Generation Network (NGN) that allows the 
progressive introduction of voice application and multimedia in mobile and permanent network. 
The IMS is used with all types of systems (permanent, mobile or wireless), including a switching 
functions, as GPRS, UMTS, CDMA 2000, WLAN, WiMAX, DSL. An open interface between control 
and service layers allows mixing calls/session in a different access networks. The IMS used a cellular 
technology to provide an access in every position, and Internet technology to provide services. 
The principle of the IMS consists on the one hand in clearly separate the transport layer of the 
service layer and on the other hand to use the transport layer for control and signaling functions 
so as to insure the quality of service wished for the desired application. IMS aims, to make the 
network a sort of middleware layer between applications and the access. Applications are been 
SIP, or not SIP, they pass by a Gateway before the connection to the controller of sessions. 
Despite considerable advantages of the IMS, several limit render the IMS all alone is 
incapable to be beneficial for the creation and the exploitation of services by operators to the 
near users, it is in order that, one uses IN service into SIP protocol. 
In my Application, I’m proposing a several IMS networks nodes for mobile application 
(figure10). The signaling into the different elements is assured with SIP over MAP (Mobile 
Application Protocol). 
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Fig. 10. IMS Network node 
After this I’m developing a quantum cryptographic key distribution in SIP Body based on 
the BB84 algorithm (Bernhard, 2003), named qc: 
 
Fig. 11. QC into SIP request 
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The different ID of IMS clients is registered in a database developed with sql in QC server. I 
am proposing one QC server for one IMS server (see figure) and the transaction into these IMS 
servers is authenticate with BB84 protocol like a Kerberos protocol (Butler, 2006), figure 12. 
After this, I am implementing my application over an IMS core (http://www.openimscore. 
org) open source IMS network and IMS client is UCT client IMS ( http://uctimsclient. 
berlios.de). The figure 13   show a SIP client Request and figure 14 show an IMS network 
with QKD server. 
8. Conclusion  
Mobile networks has adopted the IN technology to provide to users of the new services that 
can be only obtained in the permanent system and improved management of mobility. With 
the SIP protocol under IP an attempt of the Mobile connection has IP and IN to define the 
new services as well as to exploit advanced techniques in the security developed for IP 
network becomes possible especially for IMS network. The SIP authentication is the alone 
technique proposed by SIP for the security for the terminal and subscribed.  With quantum 
cryptography mechanism into SIP Authentication, the security between IMS client and P-
CSCF or I-CSCF is assured and sure.   
 
Fig. 12. Kerberos mechanism 
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Fig. 13. SIP client request 
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Fig. 14. IMS  network with QKD server 
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